SC: Legitimacy, filiation of children can’t be attacked through correction of birth certificate

The Supreme Court (SC) has held that the legitimacy and filiation of children could not be determined and collaterally attacked in proceedings for the correction of certificates of live birth.

In a recent 12-page decision, the SC 3rd Division nullified the declarations of the Masbate City Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) that Joan Miller was truly an illegitimate child of her alleged father John Miller.

The declarations in the RTC’s November 26, 2004 judgment and the CA’s June 30, 2011 decision arose from the petition for correction of entries filed by John’s legitimate child Glenn Miller.

Glenn wanted Joan’s birth certificate to use the mother’s surname Espenida. He claimed she was not acknowledged by his father.

The SC, however, said it was erroneous for the RTC and the CA to uphold Joan’s filiation in the said proceedings. It explained that only clerical changes could be made through the correction of certificates of live birth.

“It is not a simple matter of correcting a single letter in private respondent’s surname due to a misspelling. Rather, private respondent’s filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her surname from Miller to Espenida will also change her status,” read the decision penned by Associate Justice Marvic Leonen.

“This will affect not only her identity, but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial,” it added.

To resolve the issue of whether Joan was an acknowledged illegitimate child, the SC said a direct action should have been filed.

“Legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack,” the decision read.

The decision would come “without prejudice” to the refiling of the appropriate action before the proper court.

Meanwhile, the SC also resolved to treat the memorandum of Glenn’s legal heirs as an administrative complaint against Masbate City RTC Branch 48 Judge Jacinta Tambago.

Tambago was accused of failing to inhibit from the case even as her brother-in-law Osias Tambago acted as Joan’s lawyer. #

https://abogado.com.ph/sc-legitimacy-filiation-of-children-cant-be-attacked-through-correction-of-birth-certificate/

Bigamy: second spouse was allowed to file a criminal complaint for Bigamy

Culpability Attaches, Liability Appends  

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:

On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision.

ISSSUE:

In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

RULING:

Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. xxx Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.¹²

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.¹³ It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

source:  Capili vs People, GR 183805 (2013, 3rd Division)

Bigamy: Liability of the Second Spouse

THE ISSUES

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. 

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy. 

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.

The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. 

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.

source:  Santiago vs People, GR 200233 (2015, First Division)